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Abstract 
Much of contemporary associative learning research is focused on understanding how and 
when the associative history of cues affects later learning about those cues. Very little work 
has investigated the effects of the associative history of outcomes on human learning. Three 
experiments extended the ‘learned irrelevance’ paradigm from the animal conditioning 
literature to examine the influence of an outcome’s prior predictability on subsequent 
learning of relationships between cues and that outcome. All three experiments found 
evidence for the idea that learning is biased by the prior predictability of the outcome. 
Previously predictable outcomes were readily associated with novel predictive cues, whereas 
previously unpredictable outcomes were more readily associated with novel non-predictive 
cues. This finding highlights the importance of considering the associative history of 
outcomes, as well as cues, when interpreting multi-stage designs. Associative and cognitive 
explanations of this certainty matching effect are discussed.  
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When a cue repeatedly fails to reliably predict an outcome, this failure could, in principle, be 
attributed to the cue or to the outcome. One could learn that the cue is non-predictive or that 
the outcome is unpredictable. Much experimental work has been conducted examining how 
people learn about non-predictive cues, and what the consequences are for the subsequent 
processing of and learning about that cue (e.g. Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003). However, there 
has been relatively little investigation of how people learn that an outcome is unpredictable, 
and whether that has implications for subsequent learning involving that outcome. The 
present experiments address this gap. Although there is little empirical evidence within the 
human learning literature concerning our ability to learn that an outcome is unpredictable, 
this idea has been investigated in the animal conditioning literature, primarily within two 
paradigms: unconditioned stimulus (US) pre-exposure effects and learned irrelevance. These 
paradigms will be discussed in turn. 
 
US pre-exposure effects 
Unpredictable presentations of a US retard later learning about that US. This is termed the 
‘US pre-exposure’ effect, and has been replicated in a number of species and learning 
paradigms, such as conditioned emotional response tasks with rats (Kamin, 1961) and eye-
blink avoidance learning in humans (Taylor, 1956). This finding has been interpreted in a 
number of ways. One possibility is that subjects learn in the first phase of training that their 
behaviour and the outcome are uncorrelated, and therefore that the outcome is uncontrollable. 
This ‘learned helplessness’ then reduces motivation and impairs subsequent learning of the 
reliable cue-outcome relationship (Maier & Seligman, 1976). In their extensive review of the 
‘US pre-exposure’ literature, Randich & LoLordo (1979) favoured an alternative explanation. 
They found that the majority of US pre-exposure effects could be accounted for by a process 
of blocking. Under this account, animals do not learn that the unsignalled US is unpredictable 
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during the pre-exposure phase. Instead, they learn an association between the experimental 
context and the US. This context-US association then blocks the subsequent learning of the 
relationships between a discrete cue and the US. Two predictions made by the context-
blocking account, but not the learned helplessness account, are that: (i) the animals will come 
to fear the context in which the pre-exposure occurred, and (ii) manipulations that reduce fear 
of the context, such as overshadowing by a discrete cue, will also reduce the magnitude of 
interference with subsequent conditioning. Baker and colleagues found evidence consistent 
with both predictions (Baker & Mackintosh, 1979; Baker, Mercier, Gabel & Baker, 1981), 
and thus the US preexposure effect is typically considered to be a product of blocking by the 
context. 
Interestingly, however, one key finding was inconsistent with the context blocking 
account. Baker et al (1981) found that exposure to unsignalled shocks in one context, context 
A, interfered with subsequent conditioning in a second context, context B, even though the 
animals did not display fear to context B (a similar result was observed with the 
addition/removal of a session-long auditory cue). This finding demonstrates that while 
context blocking goes some way to explain the US-preexposure effect, there may be another 
mechanism that allows the animals to transfer their knowledge about unpredictable shocks in 
context A to their subsequent learning about shock in context B. Baker et al (1981) concluded 
that it was likely that animals also learned that the unsignalled US was unpredictable, in a 
manner akin to learned helplessness, and that this learning interfered with the subsequent 
formation of associations involving the US. 
 
Learned irrelevance 
A second approach to examining the influence of unpredictability on subsequent learning 
uses a similar, but importantly different, manipulation. In ‘learned irrelevance’ studies, rats 
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are exposed to both the cue (e.g. auditory tone) and the outcome (e.g. electric shock) in an 
uncorrelated fashion. This cue is then paired with the outcome reliably, to assess the degree 
to which the initial manipulation of unpredictability affected subsequent learning. The typical 
finding is that animals’ learning of the reliable cue-outcome relationship is impaired, relative 
to either (i) animals that were not previously exposed to the cues or the outcomes prior to 
conditioning or (ii) to animals that had been exposed to either the cue alone or the outcome 
alone prior to conditioning (Kremer, 1971; Overmier & Wielkiewicz, 1983). This impairment 
is typically attributed to animals learning about a feature of the cue (i.e. that the cue is 
irrelevant; but see Bonardi & Ong, 2003 for a different interpretation). A further possibility is 
that animals learn about a feature of the outcome (i.e. that the outcome is unpredictable). 
In a series of cleverly designed studies, Matzel, Schachtman & Miller (1988) 
demonstrated that ‘learned irrelevance’ effects, unlike ‘US pre-exposure’ effects, were not 
readily attributed to animals learning to predict the outcome using the conditioning context as 
a cue. In their critical experiment, Matzel et al (1988; Experiment 1c) exposed animals to 
uncorrelated presentations of the target cue (a tone) and the target outcome (foot shock). 
However, to reduce the degree to which the shock was associated with the conditioning 
context, a second (non-target) cue was used to signal the shock throughout pre-exposure (an 
earlier experiment, 1b, demonstrated the efficacy of this manipulation in ameliorating 
conditioning to the context). A similar manipulation was used to control for the effect of pre-
exposing the cue (also termed ‘latent inhibition,’ e.g. Lubow, 1959). Matzel et al. argued, 
therefore, that the slow learning observed when the cue and outcome were paired in the final 
stage of training could not be readily attributed to the influence of learning context-outcome 
associations, or of mere exposure to the cues. Rather, it appeared that the animals had learnt 
that the outcome could not be predicted by the cue, and it was this that slowed later learning. 
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In brief, Matzel et al (1988) found a reduced, but significant impairment in 
subsequent conditioning for the animals given this uncorrelated cue-outcome pre-exposure, 
relative to controls. Interestingly, just as Baker et al (1981) found that US-preexposure effects 
persisted across a context change, Matzel et al (1988) showed that impairments in 
conditioning following uncorrelated cue-outcome exposure persisted when a context change 
occurred between pre-training and conditioning. These impairments in learning also persist 
across a change in the type of learning: Baker and Mackintosh (1976, 1977) showed that 
uncorrelated cue-outcome exposure influences subsequent learning about the cue-outcome 
relationship both when the relationship to be learned is excitatory (learning that the cue 
predicts the presence of the outcome) and also when it is inhibitory (learning that the cue 
predicts the absence of the outcome). Taken together, this body of research suggests that 
animals are learning something additional about the cue (or about the outcome) during 
uncorrelated cue-outcome exposure that affects subsequent learning. 
Crucially, Matzel et al (1988) attributed this impairment in subsequent cue-outcome 
learning to the animals learning that the cue was irrelevant (or non-predictive), rather than to 
the animals learning that the outcome was unpredictable. This approach is consistent with 
theories that account for cue competition effects by positing variations in ‘associability,’ or 
the degree to which a cue is associated with an outcome (e.g. Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & 
Hall, 1980). The Mackintosh (1975) approach is particularly relevant here, as its fundamental 
prediction is addressed in the learned irrelevance design. Specifically, a cue that fails to 
predict outcomes of significance will subsequently receive less attention and will enter into 
associations less readily than more predictive cues. This prediction has been well validated in 
the animal literature (e.g. in ‘blocking of unblocking’ effects) and in human learning 
preparations (Mackintosh & Turner, 1971; Kruschke & Blair, 2000; Le Pelley, Beesley & 
Suret, 2007; Griffiths & Le Pelley, 2009). 
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Indeed, the learned irrelevance procedure developed in animal conditioning studies 
has been translated to an analogous preparation used to study human learning: the ‘learned 
predictiveness’ procedure (Lochmann & Wills, 2003; Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003). The 
typical finding is that cues that have been shown to be good predictors in the past are more 
readily associated with novel outcomes than are cues shown to have little predictive value. 
Much is now known about this phenomenon. For instance, recent experiments have shown 
that it is reflected in eye-gaze (Le Pelley, Beesley & Griffiths, 2011), that it is influenced by 
instruction (Mitchell, Griffiths, Lovibond & Seetoo, 2012) and outcome value (Le Pelley, 
Mitchell & Johnson, 2013), that it is evident in causal judgments (Le Pelley & McLaren, 
2003), social evaluations (Le Pelley et al, 2010) and sequential reaction time tasks (Beesley 
& Le Pelley, 2010), and that it is attenuated in people who are high in schizotypal personality 
traits or who are currently experiencing positive symptoms of schizophrenia (Le Pelley et al, 
2010; Morris, Griffiths, Le Pelley & Weickert, 2013). 
So it is clear that, in the human and animal contexts, being exposed to uncorrelated 
presentations of a cue and outcome results in subsequent impairment of learning involving 
the previously irrelevant cue. What is less clear, however, is whether outcomes that have 
been shown to be unpredictable in the past will be learnt about more slowly than previously 
predictable outcomes. Gunther, Miller and Matute (1997) noted the similarity in factors that 
affect ‘CS pre-exposure’ effects and ‘US pre-exposure’ effects. They highlighted the 
possibility that, just as cue associability has been shown to influence subsequent learning, so 
too might parallel ‘outcome associability’ influence learning. 
In sum, there is substantial evidence that humans (and other animals) encode whether 
a cue is predictive of an outcome or not (learned predictiveness/learned irrelevance). 
However, these data also leave open the possibility that the prior reinforcement history of an 
outcome (or US) may also subsequently shape learning involving that outcome. A novel 
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human learning task was constructed to examine the impact of manipulating outcome 
predictability on subsequent cue-outcome learning. It was predicted that outcomes that were 
predictable in the past will more readily enter into associations with novel cues than will 
outcomes shown to be unpredictable. 
 
Experiment 1 
The present experimental design extrapolated from Le Pelley & McLaren’s (2003) study of 
the influence of cue predictiveness on subsequent learning to instead focus on the influence 
of outcome predictability on learning. The manipulation of outcome predictability was made 
within subjects in an initial training phase, and then its impact on subsequent learning was 
measured in a second training phase (again, within-subjects). 
The present experiments used an allergist task, a common task used to assess human 
associative learning (Larkin, Aitken & Dickinson, 1998), in which participants were shown a 
fictional patient, Mr X, who ate different foods on each day. On some days he would 
experience an allergic reaction and on some he would not, and in this manner participants 
were required to learn which foods (cues) predicted Mr X’s allergic reactions (outcomes). Mr 
X experienced two types of allergies in the present experiment: stomach reactions (cramping, 
bloating) and skin reactions (itchiness, swelling). For each participant, the values on one 
outcome dimension were predictable and the values on the other outcome dimension were not 
(e.g. skin reactions were predictable, but stomach reactions were not). 
After participants learned the cue-outcome relationships in this first training phase, 
they were transferred to a second training phase in which the cues (foods) were changed but 
the outcomes (allergies) remained the same. Because a new set of cues was used in the 
second training phase, any learning of the cue-outcome relationships from the first training 
phase would not aid performance in the second phase; instead, participants needed to learn 
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new cue-outcome relationships involving the existing outcomes and the new cues. Moreover, 
in the second training phase, the cue-outcome contingencies were arranged such that both 
outcome dimensions were predictable. Thus, from an objective viewpoint, the relationships 
between the novel foods and the previously predictable outcome dimension (say, skin 
reactions) were just as strong as those between the novel foods and the previously 
unpredictable outcome dimension (e.g., the stomach reactions). For example, the novel food 
‘cherry’ might have been followed by itchiness (a previously predictable skin reaction) and 
bloating (a previously unpredictable stomach reaction). If participants were merely sensitive 
to the cue-outcome contingencies during the second phase of training, learning of the cherry-
itchiness association should proceed at the same speed as learning of the cherry-bloating 
relationship. If, however, participants learn that some outcomes are more predictable than 
others (that skin reactions are predictable and stomach reactions are not), then they may more 
readily associate cherry with itchiness (a previously predictable skin reaction) than with 
bloating (a previously unpredictable stomach reaction). This was the primary hypothesis 
addressed in Experiment 1. 
 
Method 
Participants. Fifty one undergraduate students from the University of New South 
Wales participated for course credit. 
Design. The design of Experiment 1 is summarized in Table 1. On each trial in the 
first training phase, participants were shown either one or two foods, and were asked to 
predict Mr X’s allergies on both allergy dimensions. On meals in which Mr X ate one food, 
he experienced one allergy (either a stomach reaction or a skin reaction). On meals in which 
Mr X ate two foods, he experienced two allergic reactions (both a stomach reaction and a 
skin reaction). The primary purpose of the first training phase was to arrange the cue-
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outcome contingencies so that participants could learn that one outcome dimension was 
predictable (labelled p in Table 1; e.g. skin reactions), but that the other outcome dimension 
was unpredictable (labelled u in Table 1; e.g. stomach reactions). Each outcome dimension 
had two positive values and an absent value. That is, if the predictable outcome dimension 
was skin reactions, then the two positive values on this dimension were itchiness (labelled p1 
in Table 1) and swelling (labelled p2 in Table 1). The absence of a skin reaction is labelled 
pØ in Table 1 (‘no skin reaction’). Equivalently for the unpredictable outcome dimension, the 
two positive values on the unpredictable outcome dimension (e.g. bloating and cramping if 
stomach reactions are unpredictable) are labelled u1 and u2, respectively, while the absence 
of a stomach reaction is labelled uØ. 
[Table 1 about here.] 
The first phase of training was arranged so that one cue (A) predicted a particular skin 
reaction (p1). On every trial in which cue A appeared, the outcome p1 occurred (A-p1 trials, 
AXp1,u1 trials and AX-p1,u2 trials). Moreover, outcome p1 never occurred on a trial in which 
cue A was absent. This rendered the outcome value p1 predictable (and cue A predictive). 
Similarly, a second cue, B, perfectly predicted the presence of the other value on the 
predictable outcome dimension, p2. On every trial in which cue B occurred, so too did 
outcome p2 (B-p2 trials, B-p2,u1 trials and Bp2,u2 trials). Again, outcome p2 never occurred 
on a trial in which cue B was absent. These two cues, A and B, were completely non-
predictive of the second outcome dimension (e.g. stomach reactions). On the trials in which 
cue A occurs, there was just as likely to be no stomach reaction (uØ), bloating (u1) or 
swelling (u2). The same was true for cue B. 
When seeking to examine the influence of outcome predictability on subsequent 
learning, it is important to minimize or negate the possible influence of context-outcome 
associations that may form and potentially block subsequent learning of the relationship 
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between that outcome and discrete cues. It is worthwhile noting that the training context in 
computer-based human associative learning tasks is likely not as salient a potential cue as the 
conditioning boxes used in animal conditioning tasks (and its associated processes: handling, 
transfer from home box, etc.).  Nevertheless, to reduce the possible influence of associations 
with the context, we followed the approach used by Matzel et al (1988) in which a discrete 
cue signalled the unpredictable outcome dimension in the first training phase. A third cue, 
cue X, always preceded a value (u1 or u2) on the unpredictable outcome dimension, but did 
not predict which value would occur. On half of the trials, cue X preceded the value u1 and 
on the remaining half it preceded u2. However, if cue X was absent, then the absent value on 
the unpredictable outcome dimension was always correct. That is, if cue X did not occur, no 
stomach reaction would occur. This made cue X a better predictor of the unpredictable 
outcome dimension than the context, and, in combination with the likely benefit in salience 
discrete cues enjoy over diffuse contexts, should have resulted in cue X overshadowing the 
context. 
In the second phase, a new set of cues was introduced (E, F, G, H and Y), but the 
outcomes remained the same as those used in phase one. In the second phase, both outcome 
dimensions were predictable. That is, the contingencies were arranged such that cues E, F, G 
and H each predicted a unique outcome value on each outcome dimension. For example, cue 
E was reliably followed by a value on the predictable outcome dimension, itchiness (outcome 
p1), and also by a second value on the unpredictable outcome dimension, bloating (u2). It 
was equally possible for participants to learn the association between cue E and its associated 
value on the predictable outcome dimension, p1, as it was for them to learn the association 
between cue E and its associated value on the unpredictable dimension, u2. All that differed 
between these outcome values was their prior signalled history; p1 was reliably predictable in 
phase one, where u2 was not. All cues E, F, G and H were similarly predictive of a single 
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value on the previously predictable outcome dimension (e.g. skin reactions) and a single 
value on the previously unpredictable outcome dimension (e.g. stomach reactions). 
Note that another cue, Y, was present on every trial in phase two, such that each trial 
consisted of two foods followed by two allergic reactions. This cue was included for two 
reasons. First, even though the previously unpredictable outcome dimension was objectively 
predictable, it may not have been perceived as predictable, and consequently it may have 
been associated with the context rather than the discrete cues. This was undesirable because 
assessing learning to the context in human associative learning tasks is difficult. Thus, again 
following the logic of Matzel et al (1988), cue Y was as predictive of the outcomes as the 
diffuse context, but due to being a discrete cue, should minimize conditioning between the 
phase two context and the previously unpredictable outcome dimension. Moreover, because 
cue Y was a discrete cue, learning for cue Y was readily measurable at the end of training. 
The addition of cue X (in phase one) and Y (in phase two) also served a secondary 
function. Namely, they allowed participants to learn that each outcome was associated with a 
unique cue: stomach reactions were predicted by cues A and B, whereas skin reactions were 
(partially) predicted by cue X. This was important because pilot testing revealed that 
participants experienced substantial difficulty mapping a single cause to more than one effect.  
Procedure. Participants assumed the role of an allergist who needed to learn which 
allergic reactions a new patient, Mr. X, experiences after he is exposed to vegetables (Phase 
1) and fruits (Phase 2). Either one or two food cues were shown on each trial. Each cue 
consisted of a coloured line drawing with a text label (e.g. apple). On trials where two foods 
were shown, the positions of the foods on the screen were randomly determined (either upper 
or lower). Participants were required to predict the allergic reactions that would occur after 
each meal. One reaction could be chosen from the skin reaction dimension (including no skin 
reaction, skin itchiness) and one from the stomach reaction dimension (including no stomach 
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reaction, stomach bloating), each of which included an ‘absent’ value (no skin reaction, no 
stomach reaction). The six allergic reactions were displayed as labelled buttons (e.g. 
“Stomach Bloating”) on which a small image of the outcome was shown (e.g. a small image 
of Mr X suffering from stomach bloating). The skin reactions were always shown on the left 
of the screen and the stomach reactions on the right. Once participants had made each 
selection they were asked to assess their confidence in each prediction on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 
was labelled ‘not at all confident,’ 5 was labelled ‘very confident’). Correct outcome values 
were then circled onscreen and matching pictures for each of the correct outcome values (e.g. 
stomach bloating and skin itchiness) were shown. 
The phase one trials were organized in blocks, whereby each block consisted of one 
repetition of each of the eight trial-types listed in Table 1. Each block consisted of both 
elemental trials (A, B and X alone trials) and compound trials (AX, BX trials). As noted 
earlier, cue A always preceded outcome p1; cue B always preceded outcome p2; and cue X 
preceded outcome u1 on 50% of trials and u2 on 50% of trials. If cues A and B were absent 
(X alone trials), no outcome was observed on the predictable outcome dimension (i.e. pØ 
occurred). If cue X was absent, then no outcome was observed on the unpredictable outcome 
dimension (i.e. uØ occurred). 
The trial order was randomized within blocks. The transition between blocks was not 
signalled. Fifteen blocks of Phase 1 training were given before participants proceeded to 
phase two. The second phase was preceded by a brief instruction that participants would now 
be shown fruits, and that their job was to learn about Mr X’s fruit allergies. The two training 
phases appeared similar to the participant, except that new foods (E, F, G, H and Y) were 
used in phase two (see Table 1). In the second phase, both outcome dimensions were 
predictable because cues E-H all reliably predicted particular values on both outcome 
dimensions. For example, cue E reliably predicted values p1 and u2. By contrast, cue Y 
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occurred on every trial and was thus partially reinforced (50%) with respect to outcomes p1, 
p2, u1 and u2. As in Le Pelley & McLaren’s (2003) learned predictiveness experiment, five 
repetitions of each trial-type were shown in Phase 2. 
After Phase 2, participants proceeded directly to the test phase. On each of the five 
trials in this phase, participants were shown one of the fruit cues (E, F, G, H or Y). The fruits 
were shown in a random order. Participants were asked to individually rate the likelihood that 
each fruit would lead to each of the six outcome values (uØ, u1, u2 and pØ, p1, p2). Each 
food-allergy rating was made by manipulating an onscreen scrollbar with a continuous scale 
from 1 (labelled ‘very unlikely’) to 100 (‘very likely’). The six ratings made for each food 
cue were made on the same screen, and each food allergy rating could be adjusted 
independently of the others. For example, if a participant desired, they could rate cue E’s 
relationship with outcome p1 as 100, and also rate its relationship with outcome p2 as 100 
(we examine whether participants did so below). The assignment of foods to cues was 
randomized for each participant within each phase. The food cues A, B, and X were always 
vegetables (eggplant, potato, and carrot) and cues E, F, G, H, and Y were always fruits 
(cherry, banana, peach, lemon, grapes, and apricots). The assignment of skin and stomach 
reactions to the ‘predictable’ or ‘unpredictable’ outcome roles was counterbalanced between 
participants. This variable did not lead to any significant main effects or interactions with our 
comparisons of interest, and is therefore not discussed further. 
 
Results 
Training performance and exclusions. Mean performance of participants indicated 
that they learned the contingencies presented to them in training. However, upon closer 
inspection there was considerable individual variability in training performance. Many people 
were able to learn the training contingencies rapidly and to a high degree of accuracy, but 
15 
OUTCOME PREDICTABILITY 
others exhibited significant difficulty throughout both training phases. Because the 
manipulation of primary interest, outcome predictability, required participants to learn the 
phase one training contingencies well, we considered these two populations separately. A 
median-split was performed based upon average prediction accuracy across phase one. In 
calculating the average we only considered trials on which participants could make a correct 
prediction. For example, on an AX trial, the correct prediction for the predictable outcome 
was p1, but for the unpredictable outcome it was impossible to determine whether the 
outcome would be u1 or u2. On these trials we considered the predictions on the predictable 
outcome (i.e. did the participant choose p1?) but not their prediction for the unpredictable 
outcome (u1 or u2). The high performer group had 25 members, and the low performer group 
had 26. Because this performance criterion was based on phase one performance, training 
data from the second phase could be analyzed without risk of circularity. The phase one 
prediction accuracy of the high and low performing groups is depicted in Figure 1. 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
Prediction accuracy in phase two for the previously predictable outcome dimension 
and the previously unpredictable outcome dimension is plotted in the left-hand panel of 
Figure 2. The confidence ratings given by participants on these trials are plotted in the right 
hand panel. For both panels, the data are further separated into the first and last half of phase 
two, and by group (high and low performers). The hypothesis to be tested by these data is that 
if an outcome becomes more readily associable once it has been shown to be predictable, then 
participants will learn more readily about the predictable outcome dimension than about the 
unpredictable outcome dimension in phase two. This was the pattern observed in the high-
performing group, but no such pattern was seen in the low performing group. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
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To examine this pattern further, separate 2 (early or late training) x 2 (predictable or 
unpredictable outcome) ANOVAs were used to examine the prediction accuracy of the high 
and low performing groups. The high performing group is discussed first. There was a main 
effect of phase of training (early versus late) on accuracy, F(1,23)=68.51, p < .001, MSE = 
0.03, ηP2=.75, 95% CI [.21, .35]; averaged across outcome-type, high-performing participants 
increased their prediction accuracy across Phase 2. A main effect of outcome-type on 
prediction accuracy was also observed, F(1,23)=4.78, p = .04, MSE = 0.03, ηP2=.17, 95% CI  
[+.00, .13], whereby accuracy for the predictable outcome was higher than for the 
unpredictable outcome. A non-significant trend towards an interaction between training phase 
and predictability of the outcome was also observed. The difference in prediction accuracy 
between the predictable and unpredictable outcomes tended to be larger late in training than 
early in training, F(1,23)=3.00, p = .10, MSE = 0.02, ηP2=.12, 95% CI [-.01,.11]. Although 
this interaction was non-significant, an interested reader may be curious as to whether 
prediction accuracy for the predictable outcome dimension was greater than for the 
unpredictable outcome dimension at the termination of Phase 2 training; it was, 
F(1,24)=5.44, p = .03, MSE =0.03, ηP2=.19, 95% CI [.01, .23].  
The low performing group showed a significant main effect of training phase, F(1,24) 
= 16.82, p < 0.001, MSE = 0.04, ηP2=.41, 95% CI [.08, .24], whereby their overall prediction 
accuracy increased across Phase 2. No main effect of outcome type was observed, F < 1, and 
no interaction between these variables was observed, F(1,24) = 1.27. The confidence ratings 
(right hand panel) were analyzed in an identical manner to the outcome prediction data. Both 
the high and low performing groups showed a significant main effect of training phase, 
minimum F(1,24)=9.45, p < .01, MSE = 0.34, ηP2=.28, 95%[.12, .59], whereby their mean 
confidence increased across Phase 2. Neither group showed a main effect of outcome-type 
(previously predictable or unpredictable), maximum F(1,24)=1.51, or an interaction between 
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outcome-type and training phase, maximum F(1,24)=2.80. Note that the low performing 
group gave higher initial confidence ratings than the high performing group. It is unclear why 
this occurred. However, we note the close proximity of the low performers’ mean ratings 
throughout training to the midpoint of the rating scale, perhaps indicative of a “don’t know” 
response. 
Test Phase ratings. Our primary dependent variable was the ratings participants gave 
at test for the associations they learned in phase two. Recall that in this phase, most cues (E-
H) were reliably paired with a value from each outcome dimension. For example, cue E was 
always paired with outcome values p1 and u2. This was also true for cues F, G and H. The 
exception to this rule was cue Y. For cues E-H there was a clear ‘correct’ value for each 
outcome dimension (e.g. p1 and u2 were correct for cue E), a clear incorrect value (e.g. p2 
and u1 were incorrect for cue E) as well as the two ‘outcome absent’ values (pØ and uØ), 
which were never shown in Phase 2). The correct, incorrect and outcome-absent (hereafter 
labelled ‘nil’) ratings were averaged across the individual cues E-H, as these cues were 
treated identically. These values are shown in the left-hand panels of Figures 3 and 4 (which 
depict the high and low performing groups, respectively). 
The division between ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ was inappropriate for the Y cue, 
however, because cue Y did not have a clear ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ response in Phase 2. 
This is because cue Y was equally often followed by u1 and u2 on the unpredictable 
dimension, and by outcomes p1 and p2 on the predictable outcome dimension (but was never 
followed by pØ or uØ). For this reason, and because cue Y was shown more frequently than 
cues E-H, our analyses of the non-predictive cue Y were separated from our analyses of cues 
E-H. The measure of participants’ learning about the non-predictive cue Y was defined as the 
average of their ratings for both of the outcome values cue Y was associated with on each 
outcome dimension (i.e. the average of the ratings for u1 and u2 and, separately, the average 
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of their ratings for outcomes p1 and p2). These “correct” values were compared to 
participants’ ratings for the outcome-absent response on each dimension (pØ and uØ), as cue 
Y was never followed by this value. The “correct” and “nil” values are summarized in the 
right-hand panels of Figures 3 and 4 (high and low performing groups, respectively).  
There is some evidence that participants treated the test ratings for individual outcome 
values as independently as intended. To examine this issue, we sought to measure whether 
participants summed their ratings within each outcome dimension to 100 (or some 
approximation of this number). The ratings for individual values within a dimension were 
summed for each individual (i.e. ratings for p1, p2 and pØ were summed, as were ratings for 
u1, u2 and uØ). The mean sum of ratings significantly exceeded 100 for both the previously 
predictable outcome dimension (M=127.91, t(50)=5.85, p<.001, d = 0.82, 95% CI [118.47, 
137.34]) and the previously unpredictable dimension (M=127.72, t(50)=5.19, p<.001, d = 
0.73, 95% CI [117.15, 138.30]). These group statistics, however, may obscure individual 
patterns of responding, such that many individuals may have reliably sought to sum their 
ratings to approximately 100 but this may not have been evident at the group level. To 
investigate this possibility, each individual participant’s ratings for each cue (E, F, G, H and 
Y) on each outcome dimension (predictable, unpredictable) were investigated separately. Of 
the 51 participants, only 4 individuals reliably gave ratings that summed to within 20% (80-
120) for each individual outcome dimension. Together, these analyses suggest that the 
majority of participants did not systematically treat the ratings for individual outcome values 
(e.g. p1, p2, pØ) as zero-sum dependent. 
The inferential analyses of test ratings for predictive cues (E-H) and the non-
predictive cue Y are reported separately for the high and low performing groups. The high 
performer group is discussed first. 
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High performers. Our primary hypothesis concerned whether participants would 
exhibit a “learned predictability” effect, whereby they would more readily associate a cue 
with a previously predicable outcome (e.g. p1, p2) than with a previously unpredictable 
outcome (u1, u2). Participants’ ratings following cues E-H were entered into a 2 (outcome 
value: correct versus incorrect/nil) x 2 (outcome dimension: predictable versus unpredictable) 
repeated measures ANOVA. These data are summarized in the left-hand panel of Figure 3. 
[Figure 3 about here.] 
Overall there was a main effect of outcome value, whereby the correct outcome values were 
given higher ratings than the average of the two inappropriate responses (those labelled Nil 
and Incorrect in Figures 3 and 4), F(1,23)= 15.60, p= .001,MSE=190.26, ηP2=.40, 95% 
CI[8.39,26.86]. There was no significant main effect of previously predictable versus 
unpredictable outcome dimension, F < 1, but there was a significant interaction between 
outcome value (correct versus incorrect and nil) and outcome dimension (previously 
predictable versus unpredictable), F(1,23)=6.17, p = .021, MSE=842.75, ηP2=.21, 95% 
CI[2.09,22.91]. The filled black columns of Figure 3 (Panel A) show that for the correct 
outcome values, high-performing participants gave higher ratings on the previously 
predictable outcome dimension than on the previously unpredictable outcome dimension. A 
simple effect analysis confirmed this impression, F(1,23)=5.23, p = .03, MSE = 752.79, 
ηP2=.18, 95% CI[1.67, 33.22]. That is, participants appeared to show a learned predictability 
effect whereby the most readily learned associations in Phase 2 were those involving the 
previously predictable outcome dimension. 
The ratings for the nil and incorrect outcome values showed, if anything, the opposite 
pattern. Ratings for these values on the previously unpredictable outcome dimension were 
numerically higher than those on the previously predictable outcome dimension, 
F(1,23)=4.65, p =.04, MSE = 307.22, ηP2=.17, 95% CI[0.30,14.82]. 
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Turning to the high-performing participants’ ratings for the non-predictive cue Y 
(Panel B in Figure 3), these ratings show the reverse pattern to that seen for the predictive 
cues E-H (Panel A). The ANOVA used to analyze cue Y was very similar to that used for 
cues E-H, except that for cue Y the outcome values variable only had two values (correct or 
nil). For ratings of cue Y, there was no significant main effect of outcome value (correct or 
nil), F(1,23)=2.91, p = .10, MSE = 1293.34, but there was a significant main effect of 
outcome dimension (previously predictable versus unpredictable), F(1,23)=5.56, p = .03, 
MSE = 406.15, ηP2=.19, 95% CI[1.17, 17.86]. Overall, the correct outcome values (e.g. the 
average of p1 and p2) were rated significantly higher than the nil outcome value (e.g. pØ). A 
significant interaction between the two factors was observed, F(1,23)=9.02, p < .01, MSE = 
1999.62, ηP2=.28, 95% CI[8.36, 45.39]. A simple effect contrast revealed that the ratings for 
the correct values following cue Y were higher on the unpredictable outcome dimension than 
on the predictable outcome dimension, F(1,23)=4.46, p = .046, MSE = 842.754, ηP2=.16, 
95% CI[0.36, 34.36]. This could be considered to be a “learned unpredictability” effect (we 
will return to this idea), as participants more readily associated the nonpredictive cue Y with 
the previously unpredictable outcome dimension than they did with the previously 
predictable dimension. 
A second simple effect contrast revealed that participants’ ratings for the nil outcome 
showed the opposite trend to that seen in the correct ratings. Ratings for the nil outcome were 
significantly higher on the previously predictable outcome dimension than on the 
unpredictable dimension, F(1,23)=10.57, p < .01, MSE = 1563.02, ηP2=.31, 95% CI[13.24, 
59.54]. 
In summary, participants showed no overall propensity to associate previously 
predictable outcomes with novel cues. This was due, however, to the confluence of two 
patterns of performance: predictive cues were more readily associated with previously 
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predictable outcomes but the non-predictive cue (Y) was more readily associated with the 
previously unpredictable outcome dimension. 
Low performers. The test ratings of the low-performing group are summarized in 
Figure 4. Notice that in this group, unlike the high-performing group, test ratings for the 
correct outcome values for the predictive cues E-H (left panel) were similar to their ratings 
for the incorrect outcome values. This reduced ability to distinguish between the correct and 
incorrect Phase 2 outcome values confirms that these participants did not learn the training 
contingencies well (they were classified as low performers based on their Phase 1 prediction 
accuracy, and this poor performance continued in Phase 2). 
[Figure 4 about here.] 
The data from these participants were entered into the same 2 x 2 (outcome value by 
outcome dimension) analyses used to examine the ratings of the high-performer group. For 
the predictive cues E-H, the low performing participants gave significantly higher ratings to 
the correct outcome value than to the nil or incorrect outcome values, F(1,24)=33.22, p < 
.001, MSE = 320.26, ηP2=.56, 95% CI [11.25, 23.79]. There was no main effect of outcome 
dimension, F < 1, and the two factors did not significantly interact, F(1,24)=2.00, p = .17, 
MSE = 261.77. 
To ascertain whether a learned predictability effect was observed in this group, a 
follow-up simple effect contrast compared their cue E-H ratings for the correct outcome 
value on the previously predictable dimension against the correct value on the previously 
unpredictable dimension. No significant difference was observed, F(1,24)=1.38, p = .25, 
MSE = 267.85. Similarly, with respect to the non-predictive cue Y’s relationships with the 
outcomes, the low-performers’ ratings did not reveal any influence of the predictability 
manipulation. No main effect of outcome predictability was observed, F(1,24)=1.79, p = .20, 
MSE = 281.23, although overall this group gave higher ratings for the correct outcome value 
22 
OUTCOME PREDICTABILITY 
than the nil outcome value, F(1,24)=25.47, p < .001, MSE = 833.13, ηP2=.51, 95% CI[16.88, 
40.25]. Unlike the high performing group, in the low performing group there was no 
interaction between the outcome dimension variable (previously predictable versus 
unpredictable) and the outcome value variable (correct versus nil), F(1,24)=2.26, p = .15, 
MSE = 1173.12. Although no significant interaction was observed by between outcome 
dimension and value, a final simple effect contrast was conducted to test for a learned 
predictability (or unpredictability) effect. Ratings for the correct outcome on the predictable 
dimension were not significantly different to ratings for the correct outcome on the 
unpredictable dimension, F < 1. Overall, the low performer group’s test ratings were 
unaffected by the outcome predictability manipulation, which is consistent with their inability 
to learn the cue-outcome relationships in phase one. 
 
Discussion 
The participants who were able to learn the phase one contingencies (which 
constituted the outcome predictability manipulation) demonstrated significant biases in their 
subsequent learning of a second set of associations between novel cues and familiar 
outcomes. These high-performing participants learned more rapidly about the phase two 
relationships involving previously predictable outcomes than the previously unpredictable 
outcomes. However, no overall learning bias for previously predictable outcomes was evident 
in their test ratings, when averaged across the training cues. Instead, two opposing learning 
biases were seen for the predictive cues E-H and the non-predictive cue Y.  Specifically, their 
test ratings indicated that they more readily associated the previously predictable outcomes 
with the predictive cues E-H, than the previously unpredictable outcomes, but that this 
pattern was reversed for the non-predictive cue Y. We interpret these findings as evidence 
that participants’ learning is affected by the prior predictability of the outcome, in a manner 
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consistent with, and reminiscent of, the learned predictiveness effect seen with cues (Le 
Pelley & McLaren, 2003). However, as in the literature discussed in the introduction (US pre-
exposure and learned irrelevance effects), alternative explanations are possible. We withhold 
a full discussion of alternative accounts (e.g. context-blocking), and of the apparent 
modulating role of cue predictiveness, to the General Discussion. 
While it is tempting to directly compare the ratings given to the predictive cues E-H 
with those given to cue Y, and thereby consider the effect of cue-predictiveness on the 
formation of associations, such comparisons are inappropriate. Cue predictiveness was not 
the only difference between cues E-H and cue Y. For example, cue Y was shown more 
frequently, and in conjunction with more outcome values (p1, p2, u1, u2), than were cues E-
H. Thus, such direct conclusions concerning cue predictiveness cannot be drawn from these 
data. 
Finally, there is an important caveat to all of these interpretations. Each of the effects 
discussed above was only observed in the performance of participants who learned the initial 
contingencies well. No significant learning biases were observed in the low-performing 
group. Although there is little risk of circularity in the definition of the two groups (based on 
overall first phase performance), the generality of these conclusions is nonetheless threatened 
by considering only the highest performing half of the sample. Further, as acknowledged 
earlier, we only defined these groups after the experiment was conducted (via a median split 
analysis). For this reason we conducted a conceptual replication of Experiment 1 in which 
participants were trained until they reached a pre-specified high level of performance. 
 
Experiment 2 
The present experiment replicated Experiment 1, but used a performance criterion to 
determine the end point of phases one and two. Participants continued to be shown training 
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trials in the first phase until they demonstrated perfect knowledge of the contingencies. In 
order to be maximally sensitive to differences in learning of the second phase contingencies, 
we sought to cease this phase prior to participants reaching asymptote, but after learning had 
been demonstrated. For this reason, phase two training was terminated when participants 
reached 75% accuracy. Second, we conducted Experiment 2 using eye-scanning equipment. 
Attentional biases are often evident in participant’s gaze behaviour (e.g. Kruschke, 
Kappenman & Hetrick, 2005; Le Pelley, Beesley & Griffiths, 2011). If the biases towards and 
away from outcomes are comparable to biases amongst cues then differences in gaze toward 
outcome stimuli may be evident in the present experimental procedure. Finally, because the 
confidence ratings did not provide any additional explanatory power in Experiment 1 (and 
participants found them obstructive), we removed the confidence ratings in Experiment 2. 
 
Method 
Participants. Thirty four undergraduate students from the University of New South 
Wales participated in exchange for course credit. 
Design and Procedure. The present experiment was very similar to Experiment 1 with 
a few exceptions. First, participants no longer made confidence ratings after generating their 
outcome predictions. Second, eye-gaze was recorded continuously throughout both phases of 
training. Third, participants did not complete a set number of training blocks in either training 
phase. Participants could complete between fourteen and thirty blocks of phase one training, 
and between four and eight blocks of phase two training. The amount of training depended 
upon how rapidly participants passed the performance criterion set for that phase. At the end 
of each training block in phase one (every eight trials) participants’ number of correct 
responses in the last five training blocks (forty trials) was tallied. This algorithm allowed 
multiple responses to be considered correct for some predictions. For example, on an A-
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p1,uØ trial, the algorithm would consider only p1 and uØ to be correct responses. In contrast, 
on an AX-p1,u1 trial, the algorithm would only score p1 as a correct response (not p2 nor 
pØ), but would allow either u1 or u2 to be scored as correct responses (not uØ). This is 
because the participant had no way of predicting whether outcome u1 or u2 would occur. If 
participants performed perfectly on the previous forty trials they were considered to have met 
the criterion. They were then given four additional training blocks to cement this knowledge 
before moving on to phase two. This criterion was only applied from the tenth training block, 
so fourteen blocks was the minimum a participant could experience prior to the second phase 
(for comparison, all participants completed fifteen blocks in phase one of Experiment 1). If a 
participant did not reach criterion they progressed to phase two after thirty blocks (240 trials) 
and their data were discarded. 
The performance criterion used in phase two operated similarly to that used in the first 
phase. The phase two criterion algorithm tallied participants’ responses after each block of 
four trials (there were four different trial-types in phase two), starting at the fourth block of 
training (trial number 16). If a participant responded accurately on 75% of the previous eight 
trials (12 correct responses from 16 outcome predictions), then they would proceed 
immediately to the test phase. Otherwise a maximum of eight blocks (32 trials) were 
administered. 
 
Results 
Training. As in Experiment 1, participants showed significant individual differences 
in their ability to learn the training contingencies. Fifteen participants (44%) failed to reach 
criterion performance in either phase one or two. For the nineteen participants who reached 
criterion performance, the mean number of trials before the criterion was passed was 116 
trials (SD= 33) in Phase 1 and 24 trials in Phase 2 (SD=4.8). 
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Participants’ prediction accuracy on the two outcome-types (previously predictable 
and unpredictable) in the first two and last two blocks of phase two training is shown in 
Figure 5. Note that the first two blocks of training were common to all participants, but the 
last two blocks of training occurred at different times for different participants. The 
participants who learned the phase two contingencies rapidly may have only experienced four 
blocks of training, so their first and last two blocks of training abut each other. A participant 
who learned more slowly may have seen seven blocks of phase two training, and their first 
and last two blocks of training would be separated by three training blocks. 
[Figure 5 about here.] 
The prediction accuracy data were entered into a 2 (early or late in training) by 2 
(outcome type) multivariate ANOVA. Unsurprisingly there was a main effect of training 
phase, with participants showing greater accuracy late in training, F(1,17)=145.89, p <.001, 
MSE = 0.03, ηP2=.89, 95% CI [0.39,0.55]. There was also a main effect of outcome-type, as 
prediction accuracy was greater for the previously predictable outcome than for the 
previously unpredictable outcome, F(1,18)=4.85, p =.04, MSE = 0.02, ηP2=.22, 95% CI 
[+.00, .15]. These two effects did not significantly interact, F < 1. 
Gaze behaviour. Participant’s gaze-behaviour was recorded continually across phase 
two. Specifically, we recorded the total time spent fixating upon each of the cues (E-Y) and 
outcomes (uØ, u1, u2, pØ, p1, p2) prior to generating a response. These values were tallied 
separately for each trial. These fixation times were then divided by the total time spent 
fixating anywhere on the screen during that trial. Calculating a proportion in this manner 
controls for inter-trial and inter-individual differences such as the duration of the trial, or the 
portion of the trial in which the participant is looking at the screen. The resultant proportional 
fixation times (hereafter referred to as dwell times) were then aggregated across cues types 
(predictive cues E-H versus non-predictive cue Y). The fixations to outcome stimuli were 
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classified in the same manner as outcomes were classified in Experiment 1 (i.e. correct, 
incorrect or nil). The mean gaze dwell times for the cues (panel A) and outcomes (panel B) 
shown during phase two are summarized in Figure 6. 
[Figure 6 about here.] 
Dwell times for the cue stimuli were entered into a 4 (training block) by 2 (predictive 
or nonpredictive cue) multivariate ANOVA. Averaged across both cue-types, a significant 
linear trend was seen in the data, with participants proportionally gazing at all cue-types less 
at the end of training than at the beginning, F(1,18)=140.63, p < .001, MSE= 0.03, ηP2=.86, 
95% CI[.05,.08]. A second main effect revealed that participants spent more time gazing at 
the predictive cues E-H than at the non-predictive cue Y, F(1,17)= 10.67, p < .01, MSE=0.02, 
ηP2=.28, 95% CI [.01,.03]. The linear trend contrast did not significantly interact with cue-
type, F < 1.  
Participants’ gaze data for the outcome stimuli in phase two were entered into a 3 
(outcome value: Correct, Incorrect, Nil) by 2 (outcome type: predictable or unpredictable) by 
4 (training block) repeated measures ANOVA. One participant was removed due to 
incomplete gaze data. A linear trend contrast was used to examine the influence of training 
block on gaze. No significant linear influence of training block was observed, F < 1. 
Similarly, the main effect of outcome type (previously predictable or unpredictable) was not 
significant, F(1,16)=4.49, p = .05, MSE<0.01, ηP2=.15, 95% CI[.00, .04]. There was a main 
effect of outcome value. Overall, participants gazed longer at the correct outcome values than 
at the average of the nil and incorrect values, F(1,16)=23.70, p < .001, MSE<0.01, ηP2=.59, 
95% CI[.04,09]. An interaction contrast showed that this bias toward the correct outcome 
values, over the incorrect and nil values, did not differ in magnitude between outcome types 
(predictable versus unpredictable), F < 1. That is, participants did not learn to selectively 
gaze at the correct outcomes on the previously predictable outcome dimension more rapidly 
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than they did for the previously unpredictable outcome dimension. A second interaction 
contrast revealed that the bias in gaze towards the correct outcome values increased in 
magnitude across the training blocks, F(1,16)=58.49, p <.001, MSE<0.01, ηP2=.74, 95% 
CI[.05, .09]. No other interactions were significant. 
In summary, participants gazed more at the predictive cues (E-H) than at the non-
predictive cue Y, and across training learned to gaze at the correct outcome values more than 
at the incorrect outcome values (both predictable and unpredictable). 
Test phase ratings. The primary dependent variable, participants’ mean likelihood 
ratings at test, are shown in Figure 7. These data were organized and analyzed in an identical 
manner to the test rating data in Experiment 1. To examine whether participants treated the 
test ratings for each outcome values as independently as intended, the same analysis of 
summed mean ratings per outcome dimension was conducted as that performed in 
Experiment 1.  As in Experiment 1, the mean sum of ratings significantly exceeded 100 for 
both the previously predictable outcome dimension (M=120.31, t(18)=2.51, p=.02, d = 0.57, 
95% CI [104.02,136.60]) and the previously unpredictable dimension (M=127.98, t(18)=5.04, 
p<.001, d = 1.15, 95% CI [116.81,139.12]). 
The ratings following cues E-H were analysed separately to the ratings following the 
non-predictive cue Y, in exactly the same manner as was used in Experiment 1. Ratings for 
cues E-H were analyzed using a 3 (outcome value: correct versus incorrect/nil) by 2 (outcome 
dimension: previously predictable vs unpredictable) ANOVA. For the analysis of cue Y’s 
ratings, the outcome value variable only had two values (correct and nil). Overall, there was 
no main effect of outcome dimension, F < 1, but there was a main effect of outcome type; 
reassuringly, the correct outcome values were given higher likelihood ratings than the nil and 
incorrect values overall, F(1,18)=27.96, p < .001, SEM = 592.51, ηP2=.61, 95% 
CI[15.41,35.73]. The interaction between these variables was the crucial contrast; this was 
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significant, F(1,18)=6.76, p = .02, SEM=809.79, ηP2=.27, 95% CI[2.83, 26.58]. Two further 
simple effect contrasts were conducted to aid interpretation of this interaction. The first 
simple effect contrast showed that people gave higher ratings to the correct outcome value on 
the previously predictable outcome dimension than to the correct value on the previously 
unpredictable dimension F(1,18)=4.81, p = .04, SEM = 783.24, ηP2=.21, 95% CI[0.85, 
39.00]. Thus the learned predictability effect seen in Experiment 1 was replicated in the 
present experiment. The second simple effect contrast examined whether ratings for the nil 
and incorrect outcome values combined showed the opposite pattern, in that the ratings for 
these values on the previously unpredictable outcome dimension were higher than the 
predictable outcome dimension. This effect was also significant, F(1,18)=8.45, p < .01, 
SEM= 202.35, ηP2=.32, 95% CI[2.63, 16.34]. 
[Figure 7 about here.] 
Similar to Experiment 1, participants appeared to give a pattern of ratings for the 
nonpredictive cue Y that were opposite to those they gave for the predictive cues E-H. 
Overall, there was no main effect of outcome dimension, F < 1, but there was a main effect of 
outcome value, F(1,18)=23.86, p < .001, SEM= 823.50, ηP2=.57, 95% CI[18.32, 45.99], 
whereby the correct values were given higher ratings than the nil value overall. More 
importantly there was a significant interaction between these factors, F(1,18)=9.59, p < .01, 
SEM= 1281.00, ηP2=.35, 95% CI[8.17, 42.67], that was opposite in direction to that seen for 
the predictive cues E-H. Two simple effect contrasts confirmed this. People gave higher 
ratings for the correct values on the previously unpredictable (u1, u2) outcome than for those 
on the previously predictable (p1, p2) outcome, F(1,18)=6.33, p = .02, SEM= 751.16, 
ηP2=.26, 95% CI[3.69, 41.05], and showed the opposite pattern in their ratings of the nil 
outcome value, F(1,18)=8.42, p = .01, SEM= 915.24, ηP2=.32, 95% CI[7.85, 49.10]. 
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Discussion 
The present experiment replicated the key findings of Experiment 1. That is, people learned 
more rapidly about the new associations involving previously predictable than about 
previously unpredictable outcome dimensions in phase two. Again, the opposite pattern was 
seen for the nonpredictive cue Y. Cue Y was more readily associated with values on the 
previously unpredictable outcome dimension than on the predictable outcome dimension. 
Contrary to Experiment 1, the present experiment did not divide participants on a post hoc 
basis. The use of a pre-defined performance criterion in the present experiment removes the 
risk of the important differences in test performance being entirely due to the application of 
post hoc classifications. 
The present behavioural data were complemented by the addition of eye-gaze 
measures. Participants gazed longer at the predictive cues E-H than at the non-predictive cue 
Y in Phase 2. This is consistent with previous observations of cue predictiveness being 
reflected in gaze behaviour (e.g. Beesley & Le Pelley, 2010), but is also explicable in terms 
of the greater familiarity of cue Y than cues E-H. The predictable outcomes were not, 
however, gazed at longer overall than the predictable outcomes during Phase 2. Although 
Experiment 2 replicated the key findings of Experiment 1 in a group of people selected in a 
pre-defined and systematic manner, it was still somewhat unsatisfying in that many people 
were excluded due to poor training performance. A final experiment was conducted in which 
an effort was made to increase the number of participants who reached criterion-level 
performance. 
 
Experiment 3 
Many people were unable to learn the training contingences in Experiments 1 and 2, yet those 
participants who were able to learn the training contingencies did so relatively rapidly and 
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with high accuracy. It was not clear why some people were unable to learn the training 
contingencies. One possibility is that participants were not learning the elemental nature of 
the initial phase contingencies. To this end, the present experiment provided elemental pre- 
training with cues A, B and X (the Phase 1 cues) prior to phase one in the hope that this 
would encourage participants to treat the phase one cues elementally. Second, in Experiment 
2 relatively few blocks of phase two training (8 blocks) were provided to participants. It is 
therefore possible that some participants would have passed the criteria if given additional 
practice. Thus additional phase two training was offered to participants in the present 
experiment. 
 
Method 
Participants. Fifty six undergraduate students from the University of New South 
Wales participated in exchange for course credit. 
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 3 was very similar to that of Experiment 2, 
with four differences. First, no eye-tracking data was collected in the present experiment. 
Second, the maximum number of phase two training blocks that were offered was increased 
from eight blocks to twenty blocks. Third, the performance criterion in phase one was relaxed 
slightly. Rather than requiring perfect performance on forty consecutive trials (eighty 
consecutive outcome predictions), one error was permitted. This change was made because a 
review of training data showed that some participants in Experiment 2 made a single error 
after a sustained period of perfect performance. As a consequence, these individuals had then 
been required to undergo (at least) another forty trials.  
Fourth, and most importantly, an initial elemental pre-training phase (phase zero) was 
provided to all participants prior to phase one. The design of this pre-training phase is 
summarized in the left-most column of Table 1. Essentially, this training phase was identical 
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to the first phase, except that only elemental trials were shown (i.e. AX and BX trials were 
excluded). The same algorithm was used to calculate whether predictions on a trial were 
‘correct’ or not as that used in Experiment 2 (i.e. a response of p1 was required on a trial in 
which p1 occurred, but a response of either u1 or u2 was considered to be correct on trials in 
which u1 or u2 occurred). Participants were required to make 39 or 40 consecutive accurate 
outcome predictions (that is, near perfect performance on twenty consecutive trials) before 
proceeding to Phase 1. The performance criterion was applied from the twentieth trial 
onwards (after five repetitions of each trial-type), and from then on was applied after every 
block of the four trial-types. Participants were provided 30 blocks of phase zero training 
before they were excluded if the performance criterion was not met. After reaching criterion 
performance, phase one began without a signal or break. Phases one, two and the test 
procedure were otherwise identical to Experiment 2. 
 
Results 
Training. Relative to Experiment 2, more participants passed the performance criteria 
in the present experiment. Only 4 people (7%) were unable to learn the training contingencies 
within the provided time, and their data have been excluded from further analyses. Three 
participants failed to learn the phase one contingencies to criterion with 30 repetitions of each 
trial-type (240 trials), and one failed to learn the phase two contingencies within 30 
repetitions (120 trials). The remaining 52 participants (93%) all reached criterion 
performance in phases zero, one and two. The mean number of trials taken to reach criterion 
in phase zero was 45.64 (SEM=1.40, minimum possible= 40 trials1), the mean number of 
trials taken to reach criterion in phase one was 98.20 (SEM=6.72, minimum possible = 72) 
and the mean number of trials taken to reach criterion in Phase 2 was 28.86 (SEM=2.27, 
                                                          
1 It was technically possible for participants to proceed after 36 trials, but this would require perfect 
performance from the very first trial. 
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minimum possible=16). Notably, just as in prior experiments, there was significant variation 
in the speed with which people learned the training contingencies. Many people learned the 
contingencies quite rapidly: 58% reached criterion at the first opportunity in phase zero, 58% 
reached criterion at the first opportunity in phase one and 33% reached criterion at the first 
opportunity in phase two. A sizeable proportion of participants, however, needed at least 50% 
more training than the minimum possible value (‘extra training’) in order to reach criterion on 
each phase: 8%, 21% and 60% needed extra training in phases zero, one and two, 
respectively. 
Participants’ prediction accuracy on the two outcome-types (previously predictable 
and unpredictable) in the first two and last two blocks of phase two training is shown in 
Figure 8. As in Experiment 2, the first two blocks of training were common to all 
participants, but the last two blocks of training occurred at different times for different 
participants. The participants who learned the phase two contingencies rapidly may have only 
experienced four blocks of training, so their first and last two blocks of training abut each 
other whereas for others there may be other blocks between their first and last two training 
blocks. 
[Figure 8 about here.] 
The prediction accuracy data were entered into a 2 (early or late in training) by 
2(outcome type) multivariate ANOVA. Unsurprisingly there was a main-effect of training 
phase, with participants showing greater accuracy late in training, F(1,50)=250.01, MSE=.05, 
p <.001, ηP2=0.83, 90% CI [.04,.04]. There was no significant main effect of outcome-type, F 
< 1, and no significant interaction between training phase and outcome type, F < 1. 
Test phase ratings. The primary dependent variable, participants’ mean likelihood 
ratings at test, is shown in Figure 9. To examine whether participants treated the test ratings 
for each outcome values as independently as intended, the same analysis of summed mean 
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ratings per outcome dimension was conducted as that performed in Experiments 1 and 2.  
Again the mean sum of ratings significantly exceeded 100 for both the previously predictable 
outcome dimension (M=117.46, t(51)=4.52, p<.001, d = 0.56, 95% CI [108.21, 127.50]) and 
the previously unpredictable dimension (M=123.79, t(51)=5.60, p<.001, d = 0.66, 95% CI 
[112.62, 134.95]). 
The mean test rating data were organized and analyzed in an identical manner to the 
test rating data in Experiments 1 and 2, with the exception that one-tailed inferential analyses 
were used (as our hypotheses were confined to whether the key effects of Experiments 1 and 
2 replicate). 
The ratings following cues E-H were analyzed separately to the ratings following the 
non-predictive cue Y, in exactly the same manner as was used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Ratings for cues E-H were analyzed using a 3 (outcome value: correct versus incorrect/nil) by 
2 (outcome dimension: previously predictable vs unpredictable) ANOVA. For the analysis of 
cue Y’s ratings, the outcome value variable only had two values (correct and nil). The ratings 
associated with cues E-H are discussed first. 
[Figure 9 about here.] 
Overall, there was no main effect of outcome dimension, F < 1, but there was a main 
effect of outcome type; reassuringly, the correct outcome values were given higher likelihood 
ratings than the nil and incorrect values overall, F(1,50)=111.32, p < .001, SEM = 908.75, 
ηP2=.69, 90% CI[32.13, 44.27]. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the most important contrast is the 
interaction between outcome dimension (previously predictable, previously unpredictable) 
and the contrast comparing the correct outcome value with the other possible response 
options (incorrect, nil). This interaction was again significant: F(1,50)=7.02, p = .007, SEM = 
685.01, ηP2=.12, 90% CI[2.61, 11.58]. A simple effect contrast revealed that the central 
finding of Experiments 1 and 2 was replicated: for the predictive cues E-H participants gave 
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higher ratings to the correct values on the previously predictable outcome dimension than the 
correct values on the previously unpredictable outcome dimension, F(1,50)=5.39, p = .01, 
SEM = 575.26, ηP2=.10, 90% CI[3.04, 18.80]. A second simple effect found that participants’ 
average ratings for the two outcome values not associated with cues E-H (the incorrect and 
nil outcome values) did not significantly differ between the previously predictable and the 
previously unpredictable outcome dimension, F(1,50)=2.73, p = .05, SEM = 203.657, 
ηP2=.05, 90% CI[-0.05,6.59]. When averaged across the previously predictable and 
unpredictable outcome dimensions, participants gave significantly higher ratings to the 
incorrect value than to the nil value, F(1,50)=12.99, p < .001, SEM = 685.014, ηP2=.21, 90% 
CI[7.00,19.16] . This contrast did not interact with outcome type (previously predictable, 
unpredictable), F < 1. 
Mean likelihood ratings for the outcome values associated with the non-predictive cue 
Y are shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 9. These data were analyzed in a similar 
manner to the data from cues E-H, except that the outcome value variable only had two 
values (correct, nil). No significant main effect of outcome dimension (predictable, 
unpredictable) was observed, F(1,50)=2.40, p = .06, SEM = 407.32, ηP2=.05, 90% CI [-0.35, 
9.03]. The main effect of outcome value (correct, nil) was significant, F(1,50)=63.81, p < 
.001, SEM = 1110.93, ηP2=.56, 90% CI[29.18, 44.67] with the correct values given higher 
overall ratings than the nil values. Importantly, as in Experiments 1 and 2, these two contrasts 
significantly interacted, F(1,50)=3.44, p = .04, SEM = 835.43, ηP2=.06, 90% CI[0.72, 14.15]. 
Two further simple effect contrasts clarified this interaction. People gave higher ratings to the 
correct values on the previously unpredictable outcome dimension (u1, u2) than the correct 
values on the previously predictable dimension (p1, p2), F(1,50)=4.83, p = .02, SEM = 
745.07, ηP2=.09, 90% CI[2.80, 20.74]. However, no significant differences in ratings to the 
nil outcomes were observed across the two outcome dimensions, F < 1. 
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Discussion 
The present experiment replicated the central findings of Experiments 1 and 2, but did so 
using a training procedure in which almost everyone (93% of people) was able to learn well 
enough to attain near perfect performance within half an hour. Just as in Experiments 1 and 2, 
the prior predictability of an outcome appeared to strongly influence the degree to which that 
outcome entered into associations with novel cues. Again, the predictive status of the novel 
cues appeared to moderate this influence of prior predictability. Possible explanations of this 
effect are considered below. Finally, unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, no significant differences 
in learning rate (measured as the degree to which prediction accuracy increased over training 
blocks) were seen between the previously predictable and previously unpredictable outcome 
dimensions. It is unclear why no differences were seen in the present experiment. One 
possible explanation may be derived from the differences between Experiments 1 and 2 and 
the present experiment. Note that, in this experiment, participants were very highly trained on 
the phase one contingencies prior to engaging in phase two, so as to make all participants 
comparable to the ‘high performers’ in Experiment 1. This extra training may have allowed 
them to learn the relationships involving the previously predictable outcomes more rapidly in 
the present experiment, and that this afforded more resources to also learn about the 
previously unpredictable outcome values, thus reducing the performance difference between 
the two outcome dimensions. 
 
General Discussion 
Three experiments examined the degree to which prior experience of an outcome being 
unpredictable affected people’s ability to learn associations involving that outcome. Overall, 
our initial hypothesis that previously predictable outcomes would be more readily associated 
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with novel cues was partially supported. In all experiments, prior experience of an outcome 
being unpredictable resulted in impaired learning of that outcome’s relationship with a novel 
predictive cue (E-H). To our knowledge, this is the first such demonstration in a human 
population. Moreover, prior unpredictability appeared to impair the rate at which new 
predictive relationships were formed (as seen in the training prediction accuracy data in 
Experiments 1 and 2). Experiment 2 showed that prior predictability of outcomes did not 
influence the extent to which participants gazed at them later. Curiously, in a departure from 
our initial hypothesis, all three experiments found evidence that prior experience of an 
outcome behaving unpredictably had a facilitative effect on the formation of subsequent 
associations with a novel partially reinforced cue (Y). In summary, novel predictive cues 
were more readily associated with previously predictable outcome values, than previously 
unpredictable outcome values, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for novel non-
predictive cues. 
Importantly, the present experimental design affords confidence that the observed 
learning biases were not merely the product of a direct translation of the cue-outcome 
associations learned in phase one, or of some systematic generalization or response 
reassignment process, and instead reflect biases in new learning of cue-outcome associations. 
This is because novel cues were used in phase two, and there were no systematic 
relationships between the cues that were objectively predictive of particular outcome values 
in the first phase (e.g. A–p1, B–p2) and those that were predictive of particular outcome 
values in the second (E–p1,u2; H –p2,u2.). For example, knowing that potato predicted 
bloating in phase one provides no information as to whether cherry predicts bloating or 
swelling or perhaps no reaction. Thus, any biases seen in phase two as a result of phase one 
training cannot be mediated by discrete cues (but see below for a discussion of context driven 
effects), or by cue-outcome associations. The biases must instead be driven by some other 
38 
OUTCOME PREDICTABILITY 
type of learning. This is an important finding, because learning biases mediated by a learned 
property of the outcome (i.e. its predictability) have previously been largely ignored in the 
human learning literature. 
As noted earlier, we favour the view that the biased phase two learning is due to 
people encoding information about which outcomes were predictable (e.g. see Baker et al, 
1981), and which were not, and using this information to guide subsequent learning. 
However, explanations that appeal to other forms of learning are also possible. We first 
consider explanations based on acquired equivalence and context-blocking, in turn, before 
returning to the possibility that people encode and use information about outcome 
predictability. 
 
Acquired equivalence 
One possible account of the present results is based on acquired equivalence (Miller & 
Dollard, 1941). Acquired equivalence (or mediated generalization) refers to the observation 
that two initially distinct stimuli can come to be treated as functionally identical by virtue of a 
shared association, in this case, a common antecedent (see Hall, Ray & Bonardi, 1993 for this 
effect in rats). This account suggests that, across phase one training, outcome values u1 and 
u2 came to be treated as the same outcome value, hereafter denoted u12, because both 
outcomes u1 and u2 were reliably preceded by the same cue (X). By the same mechanism, 
outcome values p1 and p2 came to be seen as more distinct due to their reliably different 
antecedents A and B (“acquired distinctiveness”). Thus, in the second phase, compound cues 
(EY, FY, GY, HY) are followed by three outcomes p1, p2 and u12. Importantly, E and G are 
the best predictors of p1. Also, F and H are the best predictors of p2. Finally, Y is the best 
predictor of u12. Of course, if acquired equivalence between u1 and u2 hadn’t taken place, E-
H would have been the best predictors of these two outcomes. Thus, as a consequence of the 
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acquired equivalence process, E-H will become associated with p1 and p2, whereas Y will 
become associated with u1 and u2 in Phase 2. 
One aspect of the current data does not seem consistent with this account. Participants 
learned to predict outcomes u1 and u2 correctly across the Phase 2 trials (achieving 80% 
accuracy in Experiment 2). This in itself suggests that u1 and u2 were not treated as the same 
outcome. Furthermore, correct predictions with respect to u1 and u2 require that the 
participants know the relationship between cues E-H and these unpredictable outcomes; cue 
Y will not tell the participant which outcome is to be presented. However, partial (but not 
complete) acquired equivalence between u1 and u2 should be sufficient to ensure that 1) Y 
becomes more strongly associated with u1/u2 than with p1/p2 and, therefore, that 2) Y 
competes more successfully with E-H for association with u1/u2 than it does for association 
with p1/p2. Because cues E-H and cue Y were treated very differently, it is not possible to 
compare them directly. However, within each cue type, the current results can be explained in 
terms of the idea that u1 and u2 were treated, to some extent, as the same outcome as a 
consequence of phase one training. This acquired equivalence learning could be the product 
of associative (e.g. Hall, Mitchell & Graham, 2003), attentional (Bonardi, Graham, Hall & 
Mitchell, 2005) and/or propositional processes (Smyth, Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 
2008).  
 
Context-blocking 
A number of alternative explanations of the present data can be generated by adding an 
additional mechanism to the context-blocking account (discussed in the introduction) of US 
pre-exposure effects in animal conditioning. Recall that the US pre-exposure effect refers to 
the observation that initial provision of unsignalled shocks to an animal impairs subsequent 
learning about the relationship between shock and a valid predictor (the US pre-exposure 
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effect). This could be seen as evidence that animals encode and use information about the 
predictability of USs to guide the formation of associations. However, as Randich & LoLordo 
(1979) demonstrated in their review of US pre-exposure effects, the ‘US pre-exposure’ data 
are more consistent with the view that when animals encounter unsignalled USs, they 
associate them with the experimental context, and this context-US association blocks the 
ability of discrete cues to subsequently become associated with that US. Because the present 
data appear to indicate that prior predictability guides subsequent learning, it is also important 
to consider the role that contextual learning might play. 
Applied to the present experiments, the context-blocking account suggests that 
participants may not have learned that outcomes u1 and u2 were unpredictable during Phase 
1, but instead learned an association between these cues and the diffuse context cues (i.e. 
screen colour, room lighting, background noise, internal state). As argued above, we 
explicitly included the additional cue, X, to minimize this possibility (following Matzel et al, 
1988). Cue X was (i) a better predictor of both unpredictable outcome values (u1, u2) than 
the context (0.5 contingency versus 0.33) during phase one, and (ii) was likely more salient to 
the participant (cue X was explicitly presented as a cue on each trial, the context was not). 
Nonetheless, it is possible that some conditioning accrued to the context for the unpredictable 
outcome values (u1, u2) in Phase 1, and that this conditioning would be greater than that for 
the predictable outcome values (p1, p2). 
Under this contextual learning account, any cue shown in phase two in conjunction 
with the unpredictable outcome values (u1, u2) would be less readily associated with u1 and 
u2, because the association between the context and u1/u2 would block this learning. This 
account provides an explanation as to how the predictive cues (E-H) were more readily 
associated with the previously predictable outcomes (p1, p2) in phase two. It does not, 
however, explain why the non-predictive cue Y was more readily associated with the 
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previously unpredictable outcome values u1 and u2, than with the previously predictable 
outcome values p1 and p2. If outcomes u1 and u2 formed associations with the context in 
phase one, these associations should impair the formation of associations between any cue 
(including cue Y) and the outcomes u1 and u2 (relative to the previously predictable 
outcomes p1 and p2). Thus, in order to provide a complete explanation of the present data set, 
the context blocking account needs an additional mechanism. There are a number of 
candidate mechanisms, including: the format of the response measure, inhibitory learning and 
differential overshadowing. We will consider these explanations in turn.  
Format of response measure. The first possibility is that  people’s higher ratings for 
the unpredictable outcomes u1 and u2, over p1 and p2, for the non-predictive cue Y is a 
consequence of the nature of the test measure, rather than being reflective of learning itself. 
This explanation relies on the observation that ratings for all outcome values (p1, p2, pØ, u1, 
u2, uØ) were made on the same screen. Perhaps people felt that the ratings were dependent, 
and that their individual outcome value ratings must sum to 100. Data presented in detail for 
Experiment 1 (and briefly reported for Experiments 2 and 3) suggests that fewer than 8% of 
participants behaved in a manner consistent with this hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that some participants felt compelled to sum their ratings to 100 (or some nearby value) and 
that this subjective constraint resulted in the translation of biased learning of the association 
between the predictive cues (E-H) and previously predictable outcome (p1, p2) to biased 
responding for cue Y (in the reversed direction). 
One way to test this account is to examine the extent to which individuals constrained 
their responding in this manner, and the degree to which they showed biased test ratings for 
cue Y. Specifically, if this subjective constraint produced the higher ratings for the 
unpredictable outcome values (u1, u2) for cue Y, then one might expect that those 
participants who constrained their outcome ratings to sum to 100 (or thereabouts) would be 
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more likely to show greater bias in test ratings for cue Y at test. This hypothesis was tested 
using the data from Experiment 1. A measure of biased responding for cue Y for each 
individual (in the high performer group) was calculated by subtracting test ratings for the 
predictable outcomes p1 and p2 from their test ratings for outcomes u1 and u2. This biased 
learning score was correlated with a measure of the degree to which participants constrained 
their response ratings to sum to 100. This latter measure of constrained responding was 
calculated by summing each participant’s ratings for the three outcome values on each 
outcome dimension (e.g. p1+p2+ pØ or u1+u2+uØ) and for each cue (E-Y); yielding ten 
summed ratings scores. These summed scores were then averaged to yield a mean summed 
rating score (averaged across all cues and outcome dimensions). Finally, a ‘deviance’ score 
was calculated by taking the unsigned discrepancy between this mean summed ratings score 
and one hundred. Those participants that tended to constrain their test ratings such that they 
summed to 100 would have a deviancy score near 0, whereas those that gave independent test 
ratings for each of the outcome values would have higher discrepancy scores. This mean 
discrepancy score (M=20.13, SEM=5.96) was not significantly correlated with biased 
responding to cue Y, r=.06, t < 1. This result suggests that the tendency to associate cue Y 
with the unpredictable outcome values (u1, u2) was not associated with the tendency of some 
individuals to constrain their test ratings of individual outcome values to sum to 100. 
Inhibition. A second possibility focusses on uØ and pØ rather than the presence of 
these outcomes. Thus, in phase 1, the context might become more strongly associated with 
uØ than with pØ (perhaps because X is a perfect predictor of pØ and blocks context-pØ 
learning). As a consequence, in phase 2, cue Y may enter into an inhibitory relationship with 
predicted (by the context), but never presented, uØ.  An inhibitory Y-uØ relationship (Y 
predicts that the absence of “u” outcomes will not be observed) should be expressed on test as 
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a belief that Y predicts u1/u2. Future studies that use the present paradigm could directly test 
this prediction by testing cue Y’s inhibitory properties via a summation test.  
Differential overshadowing. The third possible account, which additionally assumes 
differential overshadowing,  is based on the rapid learning of associations between predictive 
cues (e.g. E) and previously predictable outcome values (e.g. p1) at the beginning of phase 
two. These relationships (e.g. E-p1), may then differentially overshadow the non-predictive 
cue Y with respect to the two outcome dimensions. That is, cue E may overshadow cue Y 
more strongly on the previously predictable outcome dimension (p1, p2), than on the 
previously unpredictable outcome dimension (u1, u2). This would result in stronger 
associations between cue Y and previously unpredictable outcome values (e.g. u2) than 
between cue Y and previously predictable outcome values (e.g. p1); the observed result. The 
limitation of this account is that it can only explain the data if the influence of differential 
overshadowing (which impairs Y-p1/p1 learning) was larger in magnitude than the effect of 
context blocking (which impairs Y-u1/u2 learning). While possible, this ordering of 
magnitudes seems unlikely given that, under this account, the differential overshadowing 
(which needs to be the largest effect) is the product of differential context blocking (which 
needs to be the smallest effect). 
 An alternative explanation for the bias in learning for predictive cues E-H with 
previously predictable outcomes is that learned predictability has a more direct impact on 
associability, perhaps via outcome salience.  This possibility, discussed below. When 
combined with differential overshadowing, it offers a complete explanation of the present 
data.    
Predictability as a stimulus feature 
The final explanation of the present data suggests that participants encoded the predictability 
of the outcomes during phase one, and used this information to guide subsequent learning 
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involving those outcomes. As noted in the Introduction, there is some evidence that rats are 
sensitive to the predictability of the US, and that this influences subsequent learning in a 
manner analogous to ‘learned irrelevance’ effects (e.g. Baker, 1979). Specifically, the 
observation that US preexposure effects occur across a change in context (but are removed by 
the provision of an overshadowing cue), was viewed by Baker et al (1981) as indicative that 
rats encode information about the unpredictability of a US and that this information impairs 
the subsequent formation of associations between that US and a discrete cue. One possibility 
is that predictable outcomes are higher in salience than unpredictable outcomes. 
Such an explanation accords well with the present observation of weaker associations 
between previously unpredictable outcomes, than previously predictable outcomes, and novel 
predictive cues. It does not, however, explain how the previously unpredictable outcome was 
more readily associated with a novel, non-predictive cue (Y). Differential overshadowing 
provides one explanation. If cues E-H were rapidly associated with the perhaps more salient 
outcome values p1 and p2, they may then have more readily overshadowed cue Y with 
respect to the predictable outcome dimension (values p1, p2, pØ), than to the unpredictable 
outcome dimension (values u1, u2, uØ). This would lead to a stronger association between 
cue Y and values u1 and u2, than between cue Y and values p1 and p2, as observed.  
 A second possibility is that, due to a bias for associations involving previously 
predictable outcomes, people learned the associations between the predictive cues and the 
previously predictable outcome first. Then, after these associations were learned, they sought 
to learn how to predict the previously unpredictable outcome. The question then becomes 
why the unpredictable outcome values were not also associated with the predictive cues. We 
speculate that this is due to inferences participants made during either training or test 
concerning the relationship between the cues and outcomes. We discuss two possible 
inferences below, but before doing so, it is worth noting that the ‘nil’ ratings in all three 
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experiments provide evidence that participants used inferential processes, as opposed to mere 
recollection of contingencies, when forming their test ratings. The ‘nil’ response values (pØ, 
uØ) were never shown in phase two (and thus never in conjunction with cues E-H and Y), 
and yet people gave high ratings to these outcomes values for some cues and not for others. 
This alone implies that participants are, at least partly, basing their test ratings on inferences 
drawn during either training or test, rather than reporting experienced contingencies. 
One possibility is that people noticed that the outcome dimensions were independent 
(for instance, the presence of p1 tells the learner nothing about the presence of u2). If they 
made the assumption that two independent outcomes were unlikely to be generated by the 
same cue then this would lead them to preferentially associate the previously unpredictable 
outcome with the only other cue available, the non-predictive cue Y. This kind of inference 
constitutes a ‘Markov violation’ (see Mayrhofer, Goodman, Waldmann & Tenenbaum, 2008 
for a discussion) that has been shown previously in human reasoning (e.g. Rehder & Burnett, 
2005).  A related idea is that people might generally favour a ‘one cause to one effect’ causal 
mapping whereby cues are individually associated with outcomes (similar to the ‘sparse and 
strong’ generic assumptions posited by Lu, Yuille, Liljeholm, Cheng & Holyoak, 2008). The 
assumptions that participants do not readily associate independent outcomes with the same 
cue, or that people generally prefer individual cue-outcome mappings, remain to be 
empirically tested in this setting. Nonetheless, it is possible that people encoded the 
predictability of the outcomes in phase one, and more readily associated the previously 
predictable outcome with novel cues in phase two. Then, on the basis of an additional 
assumption (perhaps due to the statistical independence of the outcomes, or due to generic 
prior assumptions), they preferentially associated the previously unpredictable outcome with 
the only other cue available, the non-predictive cue Y. 
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Conclusion 
The current experiments are the first to demonstrate that an outcome’s prior reinforcement 
history influences the degree to which people subsequently associate that outcome with novel 
cues. Previously predictable outcomes were more readily associated with predictive cues than 
were previously unpredictable outcomes. The opposite bias was seen for non-predictive cues. 
This finding dovetails with prior observations that previously predictive cues are more readily 
associated with novel outcomes, than are previously nonpredictive cues. The means by which 
exposure to an unpredictable outcome affects subsequent learning remain unclear. Some 
accounts suggest that outcome unpredictability directly affects learning (via participants 
encoding stimulus predictability and using this information to guide subsequent learning), 
while others suggest that effect is indirect (via fostering differential contextual learning or 
acquired equivalence). Further work is required to discriminate between the possible 
mechanisms that may produce this effect. 
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Table 1. Design of Experiments 1 to 3. 
 
Phase 0  
(Experiment 3 only) 
Phase 1  Phase 2  Test 
A – p1 , uØ 
B – p2, uØ 
X – pØ , u1 
X – pØ , u2 
 
A – p1 , uØ 
B – p2, uØ 
X – pØ , u1 
X – pØ , u2 
AX – p1 , u1 
AX – p1 , u2 
BX – p2, u1 
BX – p2, u2 
EY – p1 , u2 
FY – p2, u1 
GY – p1  , u1 
HY – p2  , u2 
 
Test E-Y for: 
pØ, p1, p2, 
uØ, u1, u2 
 
Note: Letters A-Y denote foods, and the set of symbols [pØ, p1, p2, uØ, u1, u2] denote 
allergic reactions (or outcomes). The letter ‘p’ denotes values on the predictable outcome 
dimension, whereas the letter ‘u’ denotes values on the unpredictable outcome dimension. 
For example, if skin reactions were the predictable dimension, p1 would refer to ‘itchiness’ 
and p2 would refer to ‘swelling.’ The symbol Ø refers to the absence of an outcome on that 
dimension. For instance, if skin is the predictable dimension, then pØ refers to ‘no skin 
reaction.’ Equivalently, for the unpredictable outcome dimension, u1 might refer to 
‘cramping,’ ‘u2’ to bloating and uØ to ‘no stomach reaction.’ The contingencies shown in the 
left-hand column (labelled Phase 0) were only presented in Experiment 3.  
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Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Mean prediction accuracy (proportion of correct outcome predictions) in Phase 1of 
Experiment 1 for the low- and high-performing groups. Prediction accuracy for the high 
performing group is indicated by the open circles, whereas the low performing group is 
indicated by open triangles. Prediction accuracy for outcomes that were possible to predict on 
each trial (labelled ‘Pred’, unbroken lines) are shown separately to those outcomes which 
were not possible to predict (labelled ‘Unpred’, broken lines) for both groups of participants. 
Each block of training included 16 trials (2 repetitions of each trial type). The dotted 
horizontal lines indicate 50% accuracy (the maximum achievable for the unpredictable 
outcomes values) and 33% accuracy (chance performance, assuming no knowledge of the 
predictable or unpredictable outcomes values). Error bars indicate SEM. 
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Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean prediction accuracy (left-hand panel) and confidence ratings (right-
hand panel) in Phase 2 for the low- and high-performing groups. Prediction accuracy and 
mean confidence for the previously predictable outcomes are indicated by the empty triangles 
and solid lines. Prediction accuracy and mean confidence for the previously unpredictable 
outcomes is indicated by the filled circles and dashed lines. Error bars indicate SEM. 
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Figure 3.  
 
 Figure 3. Mean likelihood ratings of the high-performing group at test in Experiment 
1. Panel A refers to ratings following presentation of the predictive cues E-H, and panel B 
refers to ratings following the non-predictive cue Y. In both panels, filled black columns 
indicate ratings given for the ‘correct’ response (see text for definitions) and unfilled columns 
indicate ratings for the ‘nil’ outcome response. The additional grey columns in the left-hand 
panel refer to mean ratings given to the ‘incorrect’ outcome value. Error bars indicated SEM. 
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Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Mean likelihood ratings of the low-performing group at test in Experiment 
1. Panel A refers to ratings following presentation of the predictive cues E-H, and panel B 
refers to ratings following the non-predictive cue Y. In both panels, filled black columns 
indicate ratings given for the ‘correct’ response (see text for definitions) and unfilled columns 
indicate ratings for the ‘nil’ outcome response. The additional grey columns in the left-hand 
panel refer to mean ratings given to the ‘incorrect’ outcome value. Error bars indicated SEM. 
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Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Prediction accuracy in Phase 2 of Experiment 2. Prediction accuracy for the 
previously predictable outcomes is indicated by the empty triangles, and prediction accuracy 
for the previously unpredictable outcomes is indicated by the filled circles. Error bars 
indicated SEM. 
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Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Mean dwell times for the cues (Panel A) and outcomes (Panel B) in Phase 2 
of Experiment 2. For Panel A, the unbroken black line with unfilled squares refers to dwell 
times for the predictive cues E-H and the broken grey line refers to dwell times for the non-
predictive cue Y. In Panel B, the solid lines with filled squares refer to dwell times for correct 
outcome values, the broken black lines with unfilled squares refers to dwell times for 
incorrect outcome values, and the dotted grey line refers to dwell times for the nil outcome 
values.  Error bars indicate SEM. 
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Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. Mean likelihood ratings in Experiment 2 for the predictive cues E-H (Panel 
A) and for the non-predictive cue Y (Panel B). For both panels, the black filled columns 
indicate ratings for the correct outcome values, whereas the unfilled columns indicate ratings 
for the nil outcome values. For the left-hand panel only, the grey columns indicate mean 
ratings for the incorrect outcome value (there was no “incorrect” value for the non-predictive 
cue Y shown in the right-hand panel). Error bars indicated SEM.  
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Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Prediction accuracy in Phase 2 of Experiment 3. Prediction accuracy for the 
previously predictable outcomes is indicated by the empty triangles, and prediction accuracy 
for the previously unpredictable outcomes is indicated by the filled circles. Error bars 
indicated SEM. 
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Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Mean likelihood ratings in Experiment 3 for the predictive cues E-H (Panel 
A) and for the non-predictive cue Y (Panel B). For both panels, the black filled columns 
indicate ratings for the correct outcome values, whereas the unfilled columns indicate ratings 
for the nil outcome values. For the left-hand panel only, the grey columns indicate mean 
ratings for the incorrect outcome value (there was no “incorrect” value for the non-predictive 
cue Y shown in the right-hand panel). Error bars indicated SEM. 
 
 
